

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 12 October, 1943 - File No. 13

1



**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	telegram	Amemb Jidda to Sec State	10/18/73	B
2	reports	Spot Reports	10/18/73	B
3	reports	Intelligence Information Cables	10/18/73	B
4	telegram	Amemb Lisbon to Sec State	10/18/73	B
5	memo	to Savnders re: ARAMCO	10/18/73	B
6	brief	re: Soviet military transports	10/18/73	B
7	memo	to Savnders re: OPEC	10/18/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1175

FOLDER TITLE

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RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.  
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E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.  
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 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.  
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Octol 18, 1973 *war*

Talking Points on the Middle East

U.S. Diplomatic Efforts

Q: What is the U.S. doing diplomatically to bring the Middle East ~~to~~ <sup>fighting</sup> to an end?

A: I cannot go into details about specific meetings and messages, but I can tell you that we have been expressing to all concerned parties our view that there should be a ceasefire and that it should be followed by a serious diplomatic effort to reach a final, peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict. It is our hope that there can be progress within the next few days toward bringing the fighting to a halt. Beyond that, we stand willing to play a part in working for a just and durable peace. We are not wedded to any specific formula for how a peace settlement might best be achieved. We believe the key to peace is to find a way in which Arab sovereignty over the occupied territories and Israeli security can be reconciled. We also recognize that Palestinian interests will have to be addressed in any comprehensive settlement. The United States has all along supported the principles contained in UN Resolution 242, and that continues to be our position.

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Resupply of Combatants

Q: Are we resupplying Israel with as much equipment as the Soviets are giving the Arabs? What do we hope to achieve through our resupply of Israel?

A: I cannot discuss the amounts and types of equipment being supplied to the combatants by ourselves and the Soviets. We decided to resupply Israel only after it had become clear that the Soviets were massively resupplying the Arabs. Our purpose is to maintain the military balance in the area. Our support for Israel is designed not to prolong the fighting but rather to produce a situation in which a diplomatic solution to the conflict is possible. It is not our intention to become directly involved in the fighting.

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Detente

Q: How badly have recent Soviet actions in the Middle East damaged East-West detente?

A: I do not want to characterize recent Soviet actions in the Middle East as they relate to the broader question of East-West detente. I will say, however, that the detente is bound to be tested from time to time as situations arise in which the major powers have diverging views and interests. We believe that the policy of



detente helps to ensure that differences between the major powers do not develop into dangerous and direct confrontations between them. There is a limit beyond which the Soviets cannot step without endangering detente, but in our judgment this point has not yet been reached.

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Oil

Q: How will Arab restrictions on oil exports affect the U.S. in terms both of our energy situation at home and our policy toward the Middle East?

A: We are studying the latest actions by the Arab oil-producing states on oil prices and production, and we do not want to comment specifically at this time. In any case, our policy toward the Middle East will be determined by what we believe will be fair and equitable for the people of the region and will serve the cause of peace. Let me also remind you that this Administration has been examining the energy problem for some time and has proposed important legislation to move us toward greater self-sufficiency.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 04723 181602Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-07

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 NIC-01 SAJ-01 AF-10 CCO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 NEA-10 USSS-00 DRC-01 /159 W  
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P 181534Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7587  
INFO AMCONSUL ZAGREB

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BELGRADE 4723

E.O. 11652: NIA  
TAGS: YO PFOR  
SUBJECT: YUGOSLAVS CONFIRM SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS

REFERENCE: BELGRADE 4631

1. AFTER A WEEK OF TURNING AWAY INQUIRIES ON THE SUBJECT,  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARIAT PRESS SPOESMAN MILAN ZUPAN  
CONFIRMED SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS IN AN OCTOBER 18 PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. COUCHING HIS REMARKS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF YUGOSLAVIA'S  
RESPONSIBILITY AS A NONALIGNED COUNTRY TO AID THE ARAB  
COUNTRIES IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST AGRESSION, ZUPAN SAID  
"AS LONG AS ARAB COUNTRIES ARE EXPOSED TO AGGRESSION, YUGOSLAVIA  
WILL, WITHIN ITS CAPACITIES, PROVIDE MORAL, POLITICAL AND MATERIAL  
SUPPORT AND AID, INCLUDING THE FACILITIES WHICH THE ARAB COUNTRIES  
REQUEST FROM US REGARDING THE USE OF OUR AIR SPACE FOR THE  
TRANSPORTATION OF THE AID THEY NEED."

3. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER THE US AND YUGOSLAVIA  
HAD CONSULTED ON THE MIDEAST CONFLICT, ZUPAN SAID THAT THE TWO  
COUNTRIES ARE IN PERMANENT CONTACT ON ITEMS OF

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MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING BOTH THOSE ON WHICH THEY AGREE AND THOSE ON WHICH THEY DISAGREE. IT WAS YUGOSLAVIA'S VIEW, HE CONTINUED THAT DISAGREEMENT ON SOME ISSUES SHOULD NOT DETER FROM CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER THE US HAD ASKED YUGOSLAVIA TO CLOSE ITS AIRSPACE TO SOVIET FLIGHTS, ZUPAN SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT.

5. ZUPAN ALSO HAD NO RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER THE SOVIET FLIGHTS WERE CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, TO A QUERY WHETHER SOVIET FLIGHTS WERE LANDING IN YUGOSLAVIA, ZUPAN SAID "THERE HAVE BEEN VARIOUS SPECULATIONS ON THIS."  
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PAGE 01 OSLO 03868 190949Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSC-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

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P 181518Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7261  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION NATO

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET OSLO 3868

EXDIS

COPENHAGEN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR XF NO UR OVIP (STOESSEL, WALTER)  
SUBJECT: U.S.-NORWEGIAN CONSULTATIONS: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

D/B

BEGIN SUMMARY. NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL ON OCTOBER 17 THAT HE PLANS TO EXPRESS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR NORWEGIAN CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET ARMS RESUPPLY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES. FRYDENLUND VOICED ALARM, HOWEVER, OVER THE U.S. BRIEFING TO THE NAC ON THE MIDEAST SITUATION AND ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER A JOINT WESTERN REACTION TO CURRENT SOVIET CONDUCT MIGHT NOT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. NORWAY'S MAIN ROLE IN THE MIDEAST IS AS A PROVIDER OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES, AND TO REMAIN ACCEPTABLE IN THIS ROLE IT MUST DIVORCE ITS CONCERNS OVER THE ATLANTIC ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FROM TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT ITSELF. STOESSEL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMONSTRATING TO THE SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET. END SUMMARY

1. DURING HIS HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL AND THE AMBASSADOR OCTOBER 17, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN

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
MINISTER KNUT FRYDENLUND SAID NORWEGIANS WERE "ALARMED" BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S REPORT TO THE NAC ON SERIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ASKED FOR CURRENT U.S. VIEWS. STOESEL EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN AT SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN MOUNTING MASSIVE AIRLIFT, WHICH MEANT U.S. HAD TO BEGIN RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL IN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE SO THAT PRESSURES MIGHT BEGIN TO MOVE BOTH SIDES TOWARD A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT PEACE.

2. STOESEL EMPHASIZED THAT THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND OF CONTINUED EFFORTS AT DETENTE IS ONE THAT AFFECTS NOT JUST THE U.S. BUT THE NATO ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET; RUMSFELD'S NAC STATEMENT WAS AN APPEAL FOR SOLIDARITY AND UNDERSTANDING ON THAT POINT. ASKED BY FRYDENLUND WHETHER THERE IS SOME KIND OF U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OR MUTUAL CONSENSUS ON ESCALATION AT AN EVEN PACE WHICH WOULD KEEP THE SITUATION FROM GETTING OUT OF CONTROL, STOESEL RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HOPES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO LET THE SITUATION GET OUT OF CONTROL. HE STRESSED THAT U.S. EFFORTS ARE LIMITED TO RESUPPLY AND THAT THE U.S. HAS NO INTENTION OF PUTTING IN MEN.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE NAC DISCUSSION RAISED QUESTIONS OF BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE. FORMALLY, THE MIDDLE EAST IS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA--THOUGH IT IS OBVIOUS THE WAR IS REACHING A MAGNITUDE WHICH BEGINS TO BE OF CONCERN TO ALL NATO MEMBERS. AS FOR SUBSTANCE, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER IT IS WISE FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ACT AS A BLOC IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIETS AND WONDERED WHETHER JOINT ACTION, FOR EXAMPLE WITH REGARD TO CSCE, MIGHT NOT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

4. STOESEL OBSERVED THAT WE ARE WITNESSING SOVIET CRISIS-RELATED CONDUCT WHICH SEEMS TO BE QUITE DANGEROUS AND WHICH AFFECTS US ALL. THEY ARE PROFESSING DETENTE BUT ACTING IN AN OPPOSITE WAY. OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH CONDUCT SHOULD BE BROUGHT HOME TO THE SOVIETS; IF THEY ARE GOING TO





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CONTINUE THIS ADVENTUROUS POLICY IN THE MIDEAST, THEY MAY HAVE TO PAY A PRICE, IN TERMS OF THEIR DESIRES FOR SUCH MATTERS AS MORE TRADE AND A SUCCESSFUL CSCE. TO MAKE THIS POINT EFFECTIVELY, HOWEVER, ALL THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO ACT CONSISTENTLY. AT THE SAME TIME, STOESSEL OBSERVED, WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS IN THE SITUATION AND ARE CONSTANTLY URGING MODERATION. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ARE CAREFULLY PHRASED TO AVOID ANY JUDGMENT THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN VIOLATED. POLITICAL DIRECTOR GENERAL VIBE OBSERVED THAT IT WAS THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THAT ATTITUDE AND AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT THAT HAD SURPRISED THE NORWEGIANS, TO WHICH STOESSEL RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO INCONSISTENCY. WHAT WE ARE URGING IS THAT OUR CONCERNS BE BROUGHT HOME, QUIETLY, TO THE SOVIETS.

5. VIBE ELABORATED NORWEGIAN CONCERNS BY NOTING THAT NORWAY'S ONLY ROLE IN THE MIDEAST IS AS A CONTRIBUTOR OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES. TO CONTINUE THIS ROLE, NORWAY MUST REMAIN ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. IN PREVIOUS NATO DISCUSSIONS OF THE MIDEAST, THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AREA PROBLEMS AND THE ATLANTIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM; ANY POSITION IN NATO THAT NORWAY WOULD SUBSCRIBE TO WOULD HAVE TO BE DIVORCED FROM THE CONFLICT AS SUCH. VIBE THOUGHT THE NORWEGIANS MIGHT TELL THE SOVIETS THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ARMS SUPPLY BUT NORWAY CANNOT SEEM TO TAKE SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

6. FRYDENLUND (WHO HAD BEEN IN OFFICE ONLY 24 HOURS) SAID HE AGREED WITH THE POINTS JUST MADE BY VIBE AND THAT HE WOULD IN TURN MAKE THEM TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHOM HE WAS TO SEE ON OCTOBER 18. MR STOESSEL SAID THAT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL.

7. THIS TELEGRAM WAS DRAFTED AFTER ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL'S DEPARTURE FOR COPENHAGEN. BYRNE

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 NIC-01

SAJ-01 OMB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DRC-01 /160 W

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P 181343Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3162  
INFO USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 12972

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AG, UR, XF

SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE VISIT TO MOSCOW, OCTOBER 14-15

REF: MOSCOW 12804

1. SUMMARY: BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR HERE, FRENCH AMBASSADOR VIMONT REPORTS THAT ALGERIANS WERE SATISFIED WITH BOUMEDIENE VISIT. THEY RECEIVED COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD SEND ALL NECESSARY MATERIEL TO THE ARAB STATES DURING THE PRESENT CONFLICT. NO REQUEST WAS MADE FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION FROM THE ALGERIAN SIDE, KNOWING THAT THIS WOULD BE REFUSED. THE IMPRESSION OF THE ALGERIANS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE ARAB STATES FALLS SHORT OF THE US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. END SUMMARY

2. AT THE WEEKLY QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OCTOBER 18, FRENCH AMBASSADOR VIMONT SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE BOUMEDIENE

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VISIT WITH ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR REDHA MALEK.

A. THE VISIT OF BOUMEDIENNE WAS SPONTANEOUS; NO INVITATION HAD BEEN EXTENDED FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.

B. DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL (REFTEL) AND LASTED FROM 6:30 P.M., OCTOBER 14 TO 6 A.M. OCTOBER 15. THE SOVIET SIDE THEN REMAINED TOGETHER FOR ANOTHER TWO HOURS FOR INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS.

C. THE ALGERIAN SIDE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE VISIT SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD CONVEYED COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD SEND ALL NECESSARY MATERIEL TO THE ARAB STATES.

D. THE ALGERIANS DID NOT ASK THE SOVIET SIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY KNEW THAT THIS IDEA WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS.

4. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS, MALEK REFERRED TO THE SADAT SPEECH SAYING HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE CONCESSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE, I.E., AGREEMENT TO SIT DOWN AT A CONFERENCE TABLE WITH THE ISRAELIS AND SECONDLY TO AGREE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE.

5. VIMONT SAID HE HAD TWO IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS CONVERSATION WITH MALEK. FIRST, THE ALGERIANS REALIZE WITH GREAT PRECISION THAT THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE ARAB STATES IS NOT OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE OR QUALITY AS THE US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. IF THE SITUATION SHOULD DETERIORATE WITH A CONFRONTATION DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, THE ARABS SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DISENGAGE FROM ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS WHILE THE US WOULD CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. THE EQUILIBRIUM WHICH EXISTS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION WOULD THUS BE DESTROYED TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE ARAB SIDE. SECONDLY, MALEK, BY IMPLICATION, DID NOT APPEAR TO BE OPTIMISTIC REGARDING THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST OF THE ARAB STATES IN THE PRESENT MILITARY CONFLICT. WHILE THE SITUATION MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TODAY, THE ARABS RECOGNIZE THAT IT COULD DETERIORATE RAPIDLY TOMORROW.

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6. COMMENT: I WOULD GUESS THAT AMBASSADOR VIMONT'S  
IMPRESSIONS REFLECT HIS EMBASSY'S ANALYSIS OF THE  
EXTENT OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE ARABS RATHER  
THAN CONCLUSIONS FLOWING FROM A SINGLE CONVERSATION  
WITH AMBASSADOR MALEK.  
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report #40

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, Oct. 18, 1981

'A  
'R  
'V

Military Situation

'EC  
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'I (LDX)  
'D (LDX)  
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An Israeli spokesman reported a quiet night on Syrian and Sinai fronts. Despite Egyptian claims to the contrary, October 18 an Israeli report prepared at 0030 local (1830 EDT) stated the Israeli penetration force was still west of the Suez Canal and a fixed bridge to the West Bank was in place. Israeli naval units bombarded shore installations in the Port Said and Ras Za'farna (Gulf of Suez) areas and carried out sabotage operations against several Egyptian naval vessels at Port Said and Ghurdaga. Syrian aircraft in the late afternoon of October 17 bombed Majdal Shams, in the Golan Heights near Mt. Hermon, killing two and wounding 15. Katyusha rockets fired by terrorists along the Lebanese border wounded one Israeli civilian in Shlomi and damaged electrical installations there. Two terrorists were reportedly killed.

Lebanese postal officials reported Lebanon's under-sea communications link with Europe via Marseilles was cut at 1:15 a.m. Beirut time October 18 (1915 EDT), allegedly following three explosions 20 miles off-shore. A Lebanese Army source speculates that frogmen from an unidentified vessel sabotaged the cable. One Lebanese paper blames the Israelis.

Soviet Resupply

Israeli sources state that since the outbreak of hostilities 105 Soviet AN-12 and 22 AN-22 aircraft have

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GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981



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arrived in Egypt. Twenty AN-12 arrived on October 17 and 18 are on their way. Syria has received 228 AN-12 shipments. During the hostilities 15 Soviet merchantmen have arrived in Egypt and 11-12 in Syrian ports. The North Korean News Agency reports North Korea has decided to give military aid to Egypt and Syria but provides no details.

Oil Developments

Abu Dhabi announced a halt of oil exports to the U.S.; about 12% of Abu Dhabi's 1 1/2 million bpd production has been going to the U.S. Reuter correspondent Colin Fox reports from Kuwait, however, that individual Arab oil states were given flexibility in applying the OPEC ministers' decision. Those countries other than the U.S. that might be targets for the cutback have not been identified and each state may be free to make its own decisions in this area.

American Communities

No incidents against American personnel or installations have been reported. Embassy Beirut believes that popular anti-American reaction there has lost some of its earlier virulence as a result of Sadat's moderate October 16 speech, continued moderate tone of Cairo and Damascus radio broadcasts, and the publicity given to the Secretary's remarks about there being no direct U.S. military involvement. The Lebanese Government is continuing to do what it can to calm the Lebanese media and impose restraint on left-wing political groups.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



*Department of State*

# TELEGRAM

SECRET 945

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00  
CCO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY PM:LSLOSS/CT/RS  
APPROVED BY PM - SEYMOUR WEISS  
NEA - MR. ATHERTON  
EUR/CE -MR. GEORGE  
PM/SAS - MR. FARNHAM  
DOD/JLRC - BG ECKNER  
DOD/ISA - MG SUMNER  
S/S - MR. GAMMON

0 18 421Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 206464

FXDIS

F.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS:MASS, MILT, GW, IS, US  
SUBJECT:USCINCFUR REQUEST FOR FACILITATING US WEAPONS  
..... SHIPMENT TO ISRAEL

REFERENCES: (A) BONN 14999; (B) USCINCPAC MSG DTS 161441Z  
.....OCT. 73

1. REF (A) REQUESTS INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE SHIPPING ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BONN. YOU MAY ADVISE ISRAELI EMBASSY BONN THAT MATERIAL LISTED REF (B) WILL SHORTLY BE AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENT FROM BREMERHAVEN. DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHIPPING MAY BE MADE BY EMBASSIES IN BONN. CINCEUR HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO NOTIFY JLRC OF ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ON ACTUAL EXECUTION OF SHIPMENT OUT OF BREMERHAVEN AND OF ANY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM WASHINGTON LEVEL. CINCEUR HAS ALSO BEEN REQUESTED TO

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDBRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
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SONNEWELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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D/6



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PROVIDE JLRC DETAILED UPDATE INFO ON MOVEMENTS, TIMES, CARGO, AVAILABILITY, ETC.

2. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM SCHEEL THAT FIFTY-FIVE (55) TOW LAUNCHERS (BUT NO MISSILES) HAVE BEEN SHIPPED (FYI, FROM RAMSTEIN) BY AIRLIFT.

3. WE ARE INFORMING ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE OF ARRANGEMENTS.

4. WE THINK THAT FRG WOULD STRONGLY PREFER CHARTER TO ISRAELI FLAG VESSEL AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET THIS PREFERENCE IF IT DOES NOT RESULT IN DELAYS. KISSINGER



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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

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R 181015Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8642

SECRET LISBON 3850

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, PO  
SUBJECT: ISRAELI RESUPPLY VIA LAJES

REF: MADRID 5944

SUMMARY: SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIAL HAS ADVISED THAT CAETANO PERSONALLY REMOVED REQUEST FOR MISSILES FROM MEMO PRESENTED TO STOESSEL OCTOBER 15. OFFICIALS ALSO PROVIDED INFO CONCERNING GOP PLANS FOR HANDLING INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY OPERATIONS, AND SOUGHT INFO CONCERNING TIMING OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DECEMBER VISIT TO LISBON. END SUMMARY

1. AT LUNCH OCTOBER 17 I DISCUSSED CURRENT SITUATION REGARDING ISRAELI RESUPPLY FLIGHTS THROUGH LAJES WITH FONMIN DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS FREITAS CRUZ. HE PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFO.

2. CAETANO LETTER TO PRESIDENT AND ACCOMPANYING MEMORANDUM: HE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE FOLLOW UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE MEMO. HE STATED THAT CAETANO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE DRAFTING OF THE LETTER AND MEMO AND THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY EXCISED REQUEST IN THE DRAFT MEMO FOR THE SUPPLY OF MISSILES, AGREEING ONLY TO HAVE THAT TOPIC

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SECRET

17

ANDERSON  
HOLDRIDGE  
HORMATS  
JORDEN  
KENNEDY  
LEHMAN  
LEVINE  
NEGROPONTE  
ODEEN  
RATLIFF  
RONDON  
SAUNDERS  
SONNENFELDT  
V. I. G.  
WALSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 LISBON 03850 181253Z

RAISED ORALLY BY AMBASSADOR THEMIDO. I SUGGESTED THAT  
GOP AGREEMENT TO ISRAELI RESUPPLY FLIGHTS VIA LAJES  
WAS ALREADY HAVING ITS EFFECT, CITING INSTRUCTIONS  
TO USUN TO VOTE AGAINST MEASURE CHARGING PORTUGAL  
WITH AGGRESSION IN GUINEA-BISSAU.

3. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON ISRAELI RESUPPLY  
OPERATIONS: I HAD EARLIER SUPPLIED HIM WITH  
FOLLOWING STATEMENT WE HAVE USED IN RESPONSE TO  
PRESS INQUIRIES: "AS STATED PUBLICLY BY SECRETARY  
KISSINGER IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 12, OUR  
ONGOING MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IS  
WELL KNOWN AND IS CONTINUING. WE NEITHER CONFIRM  
NOR DENY SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATING TO THAT  
RELATIONSHIP." AT HIS REQUEST I HAD ALSO EARLIER  
PROVIDED HIM WITH DRAFT STATEMENT GOP MIGHT WISH USE,  
AS FOLLOWS: "WE HAVE NOTED REPORTS OF INCREASED  
UTILIZATION OF LAJES FIELD BY U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT  
RECENTLY. IN THAT CONNECTION, WE WISH TO POINT OUT  
THAT FOR OVER TWO DECADES U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT  
HAVE HAD STANDING PERMISSION UNDER THE BASE AGREEMENT  
WITH PORTUGAL TO UTILIZE LAJES FIELD FOR TRANSIT  
FLIGHTS WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE PORTUGUESE  
GOVERNMENT." CRUZ ADVISED THAT GOP FOR THE TIME BEING  
HAD DECIDED TO SAY NOTHING. IT HAD INFORMED ITS  
EMBASSIES THAT GOP CONSIDERS PRESENT ACTIVITIES AT  
LAJES AS NORMAL UTILIZATION OF THE BASE TO WHICH U.S.  
ENTITLED UNDER TERMS OF BASE AGREEMENT. PORTUGUESE  
EMBASSIES IN LONDON, PARIS AND BONN HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT  
MORE FULLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION. GOP HAS  
DEVELOPED A CONTINGENCY STATEMENT VERY SIMILAR TO MY  
DRAFT WHICH IT MAY USE IF APPROACHED BY ARAB COUNTRIES.  
HE SAID THAT OTHERWISE GOP PLANS MAINTAIN PRESS  
BLACKOUT IN HOPES PRESS INTEREST WILL DRY UP. GOP,  
HE CLAIMED, HAS NOW TAKEN EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO  
ENSURE AGAINST ANY FURTHER PRESS LEAKS HERE (DIARIO  
DE LISBOA CARRIED SMALL ITEM ON RESUPPLY VIA LAJES  
OCTOBER 16 FOR SECOND STRAIGHT DAY AND AFTER GOP HAD  
ALLEGEDLY IMPOSED PRESS BLACKOUT). HE EXPRESSED GOP  
STRONG DISSATISFACTION WITH SPANISH GOVERNMENT FOR ITS  
STATEMENT OCTOBER 16 (REFTEL), ESPECIALLY GRATUITIOUS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

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REFERENCE TO AZORES.

4. HE INQUIRED IF SECRETARY KISSINGER PLANNED TO COME TO LISBON IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONCLUSION NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 10 AND 11. HE NOTED THAT FONMIN PATRICIO AT THE MOMENT PLANS PROCEED FROM NATO MEETING TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH FONMIN JOBERT DECEMBER 12 AND 13. IF SECRETARY KISSINGER PLANNED VISIT MADRID IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NATO MEETING, PERHAPS PATRICIO COULD MAINTAIN PRESENT SCHEDULE. IF NOT HE WOULD BE PREPARED RESCHEDULE JOBERT MEETING IN ORDER BE IN LISBON WHEN SECRETARY IS HERE.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE WHEN CONVENIENT CONCERNING SECRETARY'S TRAVEL PLANS.  
POST

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**SECRET**



#2  
Department of State

WH 18  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5035Q  
RECD: OCT 18, 1973  
1140Z

P 181032Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7905  
BT  
SECRET COPENHAGEN 2595

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM STOESSEL

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFCR, NO  
SUBJ: CONVERSATIONS IN OSLO

1. I HAD GOOD TALKS IN OSLO AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 17 WITH BRATELLI, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND FRYDENLUND, THE FOREIGN MINISTER. BOTH SEEMED TO APPRECIATE MY VISIT, WHICH WAS TAKEN AS AN INDICATION OF US INTEREST IN NORWAY AND SEEMED TO BE APPRECIATED BY THE NEW GOVT AS A SIGN THAT, EVEN THOUGH NORWAY IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, HER INTERESTS WILL NOT BE IGNORED.
2. BRATELLI IS A QUIET, SLOW-SPOKEN, TOUGH-MINDED POLITICIAN WHO IS AN OLD IN GOVT. HE IS BASICALLY PRO-NATO AND WELL INCLINED TOWARD THE US. HIS COALITION IS FRAGILE AND HE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH AN INCREASED NUMBER OF FAR-LEFT SOCIALISTS IN THE PARLIAMENT WHO CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE VOCALLY ANTI- NATO; HOWEVER, BRATELLI SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD HANDLE THE SITUATION AND KEEP NORWAY ON ITS COURSE. FRYDENLUND, THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, IS A YOUNG FORMER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER WHO SPENT SOME TIME AT THE DEFENSE SEMINAR AT HARVARD IN THE 60'S AND KNEW AND ADMIRERED YOU THERE. HE SHOULD BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE.
3. BOTH OFFICIALS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND I GATHERED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT HE AND HIS PEOPLE WERE SOMEWHAT ALARMED BY RUMSFELD'S REMARKS AT NATO OCTOBER 16. THEY FELT THE STRONG TONE MIGHT INDICATE A SUDDEN SHARPENING OF THE CRISIS AND PRESAGE A SERIOUS ESCALATION. I EXPLAINED OUR FIRM INTENTION TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HOW ESSENTIAL IT WAS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE TO ACT ON THE BASIS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET AND THAT ALL OF THE ALLIES HAD AN INTEREST IN HOLDING THE SOVIETS TO THE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN THE PAST IN THE CONTEXT OF NORMALI-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

-2-COPENHAGEN 2595, OCT 18

ZATION. FRYDENLUND SEEMED FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THIS ARGUMENTATION AND SAID HE WOULD USE THIS LINE WHEN HE RECEIVED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR-- DEAN OF THE OSLO DIPLOMATIC CORPS-- TODAY.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT ONE POINT ASKED IF WE AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE STAGES OF ESCALATION WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I DISABUSED HIM OF THIS, BUT THE QUESTION IS INDICATIVE OF THE FEELING OF MANY PEOPLE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WHO SUSPECT THAT OUR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIETS GO FARTHER THAN HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED.

5. THE NORWEGIANS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE UNDER PRESSURE TO VOTE FAVORABLY FOR THE RECOGNITION OF GUINEA-BISSAU. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO THIS AND ALSO EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE ACTION IN PROVIDING THE AZORES FACILITIES FOR OUR RESUPPLY EFFORT TO ISRAEL. THEY TOOK THIS IN AND I HOPE I SLOWED THEM DOWN ON GUINEA-BISSAU. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ANY IDEA OF MAKING LAJES A NATO BASE WILL ENCOUNTER HEAVY GOING ON THE PART OF THE NORWEGIANS.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH SPOKE MOST FAVORABLY OF YOU AND YOUR RECEIPT OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. THEY ARE COUNTING ON YOUR COMING TO OSLO TO RECEIVE IT. THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT THE DATE OF DECEMBER 10 WILL CONFLICT WITH THE SCHEDULED NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS DECEMBER 11 AND 12, BUT THE NORWEGIANS HOPE THAT THE SCHEDULE CAN BE WORKED OUT.

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PAGE 01 USUN N 04016 180133Z

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 FA-11 ISO-00 NEA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-00  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03  
SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00  
USSS-00 ORC-01 /134 W

004425

R 180100Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0295  
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 4016

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR XF UN  
SUBJ: JAPANESE LETTER TO SYG ON ME

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER GIVEN TO SYG OCT 17 BY JAPANESE  
PERMREP SAITO. ON PASSING COPY TO US, JAPANESE SAID THEY DID  
NOT EXPECT LETTER WOULD BE CIRCULATED AS UN DOCUMENT.

EXCELLENCY,

I HAVE THE HONOUR, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT,  
TO ADVISE YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS STUDIED YOUR STATEMENT, DATED  
11 OCTOBER, 1973, ADDRESSED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
REGARDING THE PRESENT ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH GREAT  
INTEREST AND WITH THE CARE WHICH IT MERITS.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN SHARE YOUR GRAVE  
CONCERN OVER THIS TRAGIC REVIVAL OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE  
EAST, WHICH HAS BEEN TORMENTED BY RECURRENT HOSTILITIES FOR SUCH  
A LONG TIME. WE AGREE THAT THERE NOW APPEARS TO BE A SERIOUS  
DANGER OF THE ESCALATION AND EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT, INVOLVING  
MORE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, AND EVEN THE BIG POWERS, THEREBY

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THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN A MUCH WIDER CONTEXT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY MY GOVERNMENT AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE CONFLICT WHEN IT STATED:

"ACCORDING TO INFORMATION WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM VARIOUS CAPITALS, AS WELL AS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, A LARGE SCALE MILITARY CONFLICT IS STILL CONTINUING. IT IS OUR ARDENT HOPE THAT A CEASE-FIRE WILL BE CONCLUDED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM HAS BEEN LEFT UNSETTLED FOR SUCH A LONG TIME.

WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BE ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, TO PREVENT A FURTHER RECURRENCE OF ARMED CONFLICTS."

IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS, AS THE INTERNATIONAL ORGAN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, SHOULD EXERT ALL ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BEFORE IT ESCALATES FURTHER, AND ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO REITERATE, IN THIS CONNECTION, OUR CONSISTENT POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. YOU CAN COUNT ON OUR WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT IN YOUR DIFFICULT AND EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TASK.

I SHOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF AND I PLEDGE THE COMPLETE CO-OPERATION OF MY DELEGATION IN HELPING YOU ACHIEVE SUCCESS.

ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SHIZUO SAITO

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PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
BENNETT

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TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

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DRAFTED BY: EUR/CE: SGEORGE  
APPROVED BY: EUR: WSTABLER  
EUR/P: ESAVAGE  
S/PRS: GVEST  
PM: LSLOSS  
MEA: AATHERTON  
S/S-0: RELTZ

DIB  
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ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SANDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHNEFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

004446

180018Z OCT 73  
M SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 206403

EXDIS

011652: XGDS-1  
AGS: GW, US, IS MASS  
URJ: PROPOSED FRG PRESS LINE ON US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL

. APPRECIATE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT SHOWN BY FRG  
IN CURRENT SITUATION.

. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP FACT OF RESUPPLY FROM  
FRG OUT OF PRESS, SUCH DRAWDOWN BOUND TO SURFACE SOON IN  
SOME MANNER. THEREFORE, SUGGESTED PRESS LINE AGREEABLE  
TO US, INCLUDING PROPOSED RESPONSE ON REPLENISHMENT IN  
FRG. WHILE WE CANNOT REPEAT CANNOT NOW COMMIT OURSELVES  
IN TIMING, FACT IS THAT USG REMAINS MINDFUL OF ITS  
COMMITMENT TO NATO DEFENSE AND WE ENVISAGE THIS AS ONLY  
EMPORARY DRAWDOWN WITH STOCKS IN FRG TO BE NORMALIZED  
GAIN ASAP.

. IN OUR VIEW, FRG SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND PROPOSED PRESS  
LINE IN RESPONSE TO ARAB AMBASSADORS' QUERIES AND AGREE

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THAT RIGHT TONE IS SET BY SCHEEL'S REMARKS CONTAINED  
PARA 7 OF BONN 15007.  
KISSINGER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report # 39

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT, 12/18

Military Situation

In Sinai fighting centered on the central sector October 17, with Israel claiming destruction of at least 60 Egyptian tanks and 4 MIG aircraft, in what an Israeli military commentator called the "biggest armed clash in our military history." Unconfirmed press reports indicate heavy fighting on the Syrian front with claims of 105 Arab and 80 Israeli tanks knocked out. There is no evidence that Israeli forces moved further into Syria. Israel reports its forces have taken 710 Arab prisoners (460 Egyptians and 238 Syrians) since the war began. The Israelis report that a limited attack by Saudi and Jordanian elements was repulsed. This is the first report of direct contact between Israeli and Saudi forces.

Oil Developments

There are press and industry reports, still unconfirmed, that the Arab oil producers have announced a 5% per month cutback in oil shipments to the "U.S. and other industrial states supporting Israel" until Israel withdraws from Arab territory. In the wake of Persian Gulf producers' 70% increase in posted prices of crude announced today, Abu Dhabi has placed an additional low-sulphur premium on its crude, raising the posted price for its best crude to over \$6 per barrel.

American Communities

During the day there were increased calls by more radical Arab media and organizations for action against U.S. interests in the Arab world. Despite growing tension, no reports of hostile acts against American communities have been received.

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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Arab Foreign Ministers


The four Arab Foreign Ministers met with the Secretary today before and after their meeting with the President. There have been no statements on the substance of the discussions; however, there was a public exchange of remarks between the President and Saudi Minister Sagqaf in which the President reiterated U.S. dedication to the urgent goal of achieving a fair, just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Hussein's Remarks

King Hussein gave a press conference today, stating Israel could have peace or territory but not both and should make up her mind before it is too late.

Soviet Fleet Build Up

The Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean is continuing its build-up with the arrival of ten more ships in the last day or so. According to DOD spokesman Friedheim, the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean is the largest ever and now totals 70.



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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 INRE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00  
CCO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20  
ACDA-19 IO-17 AF-10 DRC-01 /144 W

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O R 191430Z OCT 73  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4071  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 3181

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR EG IS  
SUBJECT: HEYKAL ON EGYPT'S GOALS

1. HEYKAL'S OCTOBER 18 EDITORIAL IS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO QUESTION OF ISRAELI THEORY OF SECURITY: IS IT RIGHT OR WRONG? ARABS, HEYKAL STATES, WANT TO PROVE THE LATTER, WHILE ISRAEL WANTS TO PROVE SECURITY THEORY CORRECT.

2. HEYKAL STATES ISRAEL MUST TAKE TWO CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT: ISRAEL IS AN ISLAND IN AN ARAB SEA, AND ENCIRCLED; AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE A POWER BALANCE IN HER FAVOR. ISRAELI SECURITY THEORY IS BASED ON FOLLOWING PRECEPTS: (A) OVERWHELMING MILITARY SUPERIORITY; (B) AN UNBEATABLE ARMY; (C) AN ARMY FOREVER WITH INITIATIVE IN ITS HANDS AND CAPABLE OF CARRYING WAR INTO ARAB TERRITORY; (D) WHEN WAR COMES, IT MUST BE A BLITZKRIEG BECAUSE FOR ISRAEL TOTAL MOBILIZATION BECOMES INTOLERABLE AFTER BRIEF PERIOD; (E) ISRAELI QUALITY MUST BE ABLE TO CANCEL ARAB

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QUANTITY) (F) ISRAEL MUST FROM TIME TO TIME STRIKE FEAR INTO HEARTS OF ARABS. HEYKAL NOTES HERE THE TRAP ISRAELIS SET FOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE AT TARTUS IN SEPTEMBER. FINALLY, ISRAEL MUST BE ABLE TO DEPEND ON A GREAT POWER. ISRAEL CONSTANTLY ASKS, IS US WITH HER OR NOT? ✓

3. HEYKAL STATES THAT TO FACE ISRAEL ARABS MUST: (A) BE PREPARED TO FACE OVERWHELMING ISRAELI SUPERIORITY; (B) CARRY OUT A TWO-FRONT WAR; (C) TAKE INITIATIVE AND SURPRISE ISRAELIS; (D) WAGE EXTENDED WAR; (E) IMPROVE QUALITATIVELY; (F) PASS THROUGH "BARKIER OF FEAR;" (G) AND PLACE US UNDER IMMENSE PRESSURE.

4. HEYKAL TURNS TO FUTURE: CAN ISRAEL RECOVER FROM PRESENT SITUATION? NOT EASILY, HE IMAGINES. ISRAELI SECURITY THEORY DOES NOT DEPEND ON TERRITORY, BUT IS PHILOSOPHY OF ENTIRE COMMUNITY. HEYKAL CALCULATES THAT ISRAELI REACTION WILL BE ONE OF SHOCK AT WHAT HAPPENED, FEAR AT WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED HAD WAR BEGUN ON ISRAELI FRONTIER, ANGER AT ISRAELI LEADERS FOR BEING TAKEN BY SURPRISE (HEYKAL STATES DAYAN'S FUTURE MAY BE ENDED), CONCERN OVER FUTURE IMMIGRATION AND OVER WORLD IMAGE OF ISRAEL DAVID IN FACE OF ARAB GOLIATH. ✓

5. HEYKAL STATES THAT IF ONE BASE OF ISRAELI SECURITY THEORY FAILS, THEN ALL BASES FAIL. EVEN US/ISRAELI RELATIONS WILL EXPERIENCE A RADICAL CHANGE. HEYKAL STATES NOT MANY ISRAELIS COULD HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY PRESIDENT NIXON'S REMARKS ABOUT US POLICY IN ME TODAY BEING SIMILAR TO US POLICY IN LEBANON IN 1958 AND JORDAN IN 1970.

6. IN SHORT, ISRAEL WILL FIND IT IN ITS INTEREST TO STOP FIGHTING IN ORDER TO REGROUP HERSELF AND LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK. HER PURPOSE WILL NOT BE MERELY TO REGAIN GOLAN OR EAST BANK OF CANAL, BUT TO SAVE HER THEORY OF SECURITY. HEYKAL CONCLUDES WITH REITERATION THAT AIM OF THIS PRESENT STAGE IS TO STRIKE AT THIS THEORY, BY SHAKING THE MILITARY INSTITUTION, PROVING ISRAELI WAR MACHINERY TO BE DEFECTIVE, AND TEARING OFF ISRAEL'S MASK OF ARROGANCE.

7. COMMENT: HEYKAL'S ARTICLE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BEFORE CURRENT ISRAELI ARMORED OFFENSIVE IN SINAI. HE

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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CONFIDENTIAL

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NEVERTHELESS PREPARES GROUND FOR EVENTUAL EGYPTIAN FALLBACK SHOULD SUCH BE NECESSARY. SECONDLY, HE MAKES NO MENTION OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES. IN MIDDLE OF ARTICLE HE STATES THAT, TO ISRAEL, PRINCIPAL QUESTION IS WHAT WILL PREVENT ARAB FROM GOING BEYOND JUNE 5 BOUNDARIES SHOULD THEY GET SO FAR, BUT HE DOES NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION. FINALLY, HE IMPLIES THAT ISRAELI TRAP SET FOR SYRIAN AIR FORCE OFF TARTUS ON SEPTEMBER 13 WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN CONTRIBUTING TO PRESENT HOSTILITIES.  
SMITH

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5 2 1 6Q  
RECD: 18 OCT, 7PM

0 181555Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8937  
BT  
SECRET BRUSSELS 5969

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF, NATO, BE  
SUBJECT: BELGIAN POSITION ON NATO IMPLICATIONS OF ME CONFLICT

REF: STATE 204887

1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER VAN ELSLANDE OCTOBER 18 AND CONVEYED FORCEFULLY POINTS MADE REFTEL WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MEANING FOR ALLIANCE AS STATED IN FINAL SUB-PARAGRAPH.

2. VAN ELSLANDE SAID THAT HAVING ON MONDAY ANNOUNCED "SUSPENSION" OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOTH SIDES, GOB COULD NOT RESCIND THIS DECISION. SINCE THEN, HE HAD BEEN CONVOKED BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES TO SET FORTH GOB POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST AND HAD REAFFIRMED IMPOSITION OF "SUSPENSION" WHILE ASSURING THE COMMISSION THAT IT WOULD BE ENFORCED TOTALLY AND WITHOUT SUBTERFUGE. FURTHERMORE, ACTION HAD NOW BEEN EXTENDED TO TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND ALGERIA.

3. VAN ELSLANDE SAID THAT HE HAD ADDRESSED LETTER TO HIS EIGHT EC COLLEAGUES ON OCTOBER 17 SUGGESTING MEETING AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH COMMON POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. ALTHOUGH LEAVING FOR ZAIRE TODAY WITH RETURN SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 24, HE SAID HE HAD LEFT INSTRUCTIONS TO BE CALLED BACK SHOULD EC FOREIGN MINISTER MEETING MATERIALIZE EARLIER. HE IS PONDERING ADVISABILITY OF SUGGESTING NATO CONSULTATIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTERS' LEVEL TO SAME END BUT WILL KEEP ME ADVISED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH INITIATIVE.O

4. COMMENT. IT WAS APPARENT THAT FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DULY IMPRESSED BY GRAVITY OF MY PRESENTATION COMING ON HEELS OF WHAT HE ALREADY KNEW THROUGH NATO CONSULTATIONS. WHILE IT IS MY IMPRESSION FROM PASSING REFERENCE BY VAN ELSLANDE TO UK DECISION ON EMBARGO THAT BELGIAN POSITION WILL BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY UK, I ALSO BELIEVE BELGIANS WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL BUT ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW. OBVIOUSLY VAN ELSLANDE AND GOB ARE GROPING FOR SOME WAY, COLLECTIVE IF POSSIBLE.

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TELEGRAM

2 - BRUSSELS 5969, 18 OCT '73

I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENTS'S VIEWS CONCERNING UTILITY OF EC MINISTERS MEETING VAN ELSLANDE HAS ALREADY REQUESTED AND, SPECIFICALLY, WHAT WE WOULD LIKE BELGIUM TO PRESS FOR IN THAT CONTEXT.

5. SUBSEQUENT TO PREPARATION OF ABOVE REPORT, I HAVE RECEIVED STATE 205850 LISTING ACTIONS ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER. GOB COULD CONCEIVABLY TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS WITH RESPECT TO FIRST, THIRD AND FORTH SUGGESTIONS MZNTIONED IN PARA 4 OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S TALKING POINTS OF OCTOBER 16.

6. BELGIAN QUESTIONING OF UTILITY OF CSCE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE SINCE BELGIUM HAS BEEN LEADING EXPONENT OF DETENTE AND HAS BEEN LOCUS OF CONSIDERABLE PRIVATE ACTIVITY PROMOTING IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ROLES OF HUNGARY AND YUGOSLAVIA IN PROLONGATION OF MIDDLE EAST WAR COULD WELL BE BASIS FOR DEMARCHES TO THOSE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF BELGIUM'S KNOWN EFFORTS TO CREATE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SMALL COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE NEUTRALS. BELGIANS MIGHT BASE APPROACH TO SOVIETS ON THOSE PROTIONS OF BELGO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 12, 1972 (ISSUED UPON CONCLUSION OF GROMYKO VISIT), THAT DEALT WITH SUPPORT FOR "EQUITABLE AND DURABLE PEACE" IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO HARMONIZE BELGIAN AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. BELGIAN DEMARCHE MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE IMPLIED THREAT TO REVIEW BELGO-SOVIET CONSULAR AGREEMEN, WHICH NOT YET IMPLEMENTED DESPITE REPEATED SOVIET REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH A CONSULATE IN ANTWERP.

7. I AM PREPARED TO PRESS FOR ACTION BY BELGIUM ALONG ANY OF ABOVE LINES THAT DEPARTMENT DEEMS APPROPRIATE. FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT OUT OF QUESTION THAT "SUSPENSION" OF ARMS SHIPMENT COULD BE MODIFIED SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT NOR PROMULGATED BY ROYAL DECREE.

STRAUSZ-HUPE

SECRET



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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5 2 9 8Q

0182052Z OCT 73 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8080  
BT  
SECRET STATE 206834

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS, USMAS  
SUBJ: RESUPPLY AIRLIFT

REF: TEL AVIV 8061

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR DECISION TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL. I SAID IN MY PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT IS RIGHT IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION, AND WE ARE DOING IT. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET, AND WE MUST SEE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IS MAINTAINED AS WE SEEK AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES AND A WAY TO GET DIPLOMACY WORKING ON A FINAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

2. I AM SURE I HAVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS WHY, IN THIS COMPLEX AND FAST-MOVING SITUATION, WE WERE UNABLE TO CONSULT OR INFORM YOU OF OUR POLICY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE WAY WE WOULD NORMALLY WANT TO. KISSINGER ✓

NEA:ALATHERTON:MTB  
10/16/72 EXT 19380  
THE SECRETARY

NEA:JJSISCO

S/S - MR. PICKERING

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5 3 3 7Q

RECD: 18 OCT, 9:01PM

R 181637Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4911  
BT  
SECRET

LONDON 12113

NODIS

*BRITISH VIEWS*

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, UK  
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

1. WE TOOK OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SEPARATELY WITH MEMBER OF CABINET (LEADER OF HOUSE OF COMMONS JAMES PRIOR) WHO HAS LONG SERVED AS AN INFORMAL AND PERSONAL CHANNEL TO PRIME MINISTER HEATH AND WITH FCO PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY ANTHONY ROYLE. WE CONVEYED TO THEM THE SUBSTANCE OF STATE 203685 AND 204887. WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT IN NAC OCTOBER 16 (STATE 205850) AND OF NATO GOVERNMENTS RESPONSES THERETO.

2. ADDITIONALLY, IN TALK WITH PRIOR, WE NOTED THAT MOST WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS SEEMED TO BE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO STAY ON THE SIDELINES IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT. NOT ONLY WERE THEY CAREFULLY AVOIDING ANY DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, BUT THEY HAD ALSO QUICKLY MOVED TO PRECLUDE ANY INDIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE US RESUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL, E.G., THE BRITISH REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES THAT US BASES IN THE UK WERE NOT BEING USED.

3. PRIOR SAID THAT MIDDLE EAST WAR POSED VERY DIFFICULT AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BRITAIN. THERE WERE EXTENSIVE BRITISH ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN ARAB STATES AND ARAB OIL WAS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO UK AND WESTERN EUROPE. UK HAD WORKED HARD IN LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ARABS AND THOUGHT US AGREED THIS WAS CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF US RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

- 2 - LONDON 12113, 18 OCT '73

4. WE POINTED OUT THAT ATTITUDES OF MOST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE SIMILAR TO UK AND THAT IN CURRENT SITUATION THOSE ATTITUDES COMBINED TO HAVE EFFECT OF ISOLATING US. WE STRESSED THAT NATO RELATIONSHIP COULD NOT BE PUT ASIDE IN ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE FOR ALL MEMBER STATES WHEN SOVIET UNION HAD EMBARKED ON HIGHLY ADVENTUROUS MOVE OF MASSIVE AID TO ARAB STATES. WE RECALLED THAT WHEN CONSERVATIVE PARTY CAME TO POWER IN 1970, PRIME MINISTER HEATH AND SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME HAD EXPRESSED TO US THEIR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT DANGER OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN MIDDLE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA, BUT THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD MUCH OF THIS CONCERN DURING PAST YEAR.

5. PRIOR SAID HEATH AND SIR ALEC WERE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET THREAT AND THEN REVERTED TO IMPACT OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT ON BRITISH DOMESTIC SCENE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT LARGE MAJORITY OF BRITISH PUBLIC WERE SYMPATHETIC TO ISRAEL, HE SAID THIS MADE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW POLICY TO

PROTECT BRITISH INTERESTS. EMPHASIZING HIS POINT, HE SAID HE HAD SPENT THE MORNING WORKING ON CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR GASOLINE RATIONING.

6. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH ANTHONY ROYLE, HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT US CONCERN ABOUT EUROPEAN ATTITUDES HAD NOT COME THROUGH IN MESSAGES HE HAD READ FROM LORD CROMER. ROYLE SAID FOREIGN OFFICE THOUGHT IT WAS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT UK SHOULD CONDUCT ITSELF SO THAT AT LEAST ONE IMPORTANT EUROPEAN MEMBER OF SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE IN A BROKER'S POSITION WHEN THE TIME CAME TO INTRODUCE DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION AND PURSUE IT WITH BOTH SIDES. HE THOUGHT THAT OF ALL SC MEMBERS, UK IS ONE WITH BEST POSSIBILITY OF HAVING INFLUENCE AND CREDENCE WITH BOTH SIDES EVEN THOUGH UK RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IS SOMEWHAT STRAINED. ROYLE SAID FCO HAD THOUGHT THAT USG AGREED WITH THEIR CONCEPT OF BRITISH ROLE, BUT SAID HE HAD REGISTERED POINTS WE MADE AND WOULD MAKE THEM KNOWN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

7. COMMENT: IT SEEMS TO US THAT BRITISH ARE DECEIVING THEMSELVES ABOUT BEING IN A BROKER'S POSITION.

8. DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

ANNENBERG

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6 0 5 1Q  
RECD: 20 OCT, 6:20PM

NODIS

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O 20 545Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2257  
BT  
SECRET USNATO 5038

NODIS

WQ

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81  
TAGS: PBCR, MCPS, XF, NATO  
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: NAC  
DISCUSSION OF OCTOBER 19

REF: USNATO 4977

1. IN USNATO 4977 WE OFFERED THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE U.S. OCTOBER 16 INITIATIVE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING CERTAIN OBJECTIVES: IT HAD CREATED A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR ALLIED DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH, AT A MINIMUM, PROBABLY DETERRED SOME ALLIES FROM ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO THE U.S. IT WAS HELPFUL IN ENCOURAGING ALLIES TO TAKE SIMILAR LINES (AND IN SOME CASES, INITIATIVES) WITH SOVIETS TO THE EFFECT THAT WARSAW PACT ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE POSING A SERIOUS THREAT TO EAST-WEST DETENTE.

2. THE MORE FAR-REACHING POSSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN OUR INITIATIVE (I.E. A COMMON ALLIANCE ACTION PROGRAM ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE SUGGESTIONS MADE IN PARA 5 D REFTTEL) HAVE NOT BEEN AND PROBABLY WILL NOT BE A SERIOUS SUBJECT OF INSTRUCTED DEBATE IN THE ABSENCE OF (1) A DETERIORATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION BROUGHT ON BY ELATANTLY PROVOCATIVE SOVIET ACTIONS, (2) THE U.S. TAKING A SPECIFIC POSITION ON THESE MEASURES ITSELF, WHICH I HAVE POINTEDLY NOT YET DONE; AND (3) THE U.S. SUPPLIES INFORMATION TO BACK UP ITS INITIATIVES. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT WE EVEN SUGGESTED CONSIDERATION OF SUCH FAR-REACHING POSSIBILITIES CLEARLY HELPED TO MOVE THE SPECTRUM OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES INTO CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH U.S. VIEWS OF WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE ACCEPTABLE ALLIED BEHAVIOR THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE.

3. THE COUNCIL MEETING ON OCTOBER 19 MARKED AN END OF THE PHASE OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH WE LAUNCHED ON OCTOBER 16. I HAVE EXHAUSTED MY PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS. THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER WASHINGTON DESIRES A NEW PHASE IN THE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES HERE AND, IF SO, WHAT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 2 - USNATO 5038, 20 OCT '73

4. AS REPORTED IN USNATO 4977, THE ALLIES ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH THEY KNOW WOULD JEOPARDIZE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AS WELL AS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WITHOUT KNOWING MORE ABOUT THE STATE OF PLAY, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DEBATE THAT FOLLOWED THE INITIAL PRESENTATION, BOTH IN THE COUNCIL AND IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS, MANY ALLIES POSED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH ARE OF INTEREST TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS:

- A. EXACTLY WHAT ACTION (S) IS THE U.S. ASKING SOLIDARITY ON?
- B. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT IS THE U.S. ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO DO, AND/ OR TO CEASE DOING?
- C. GENERALLY, WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY TELLING THE U.S.?
- D. HOW FAR WILL THE ALLIES BE ASKED TO GO IN REACTING TO SOVIET ACTIONS AND IN SUPPORTING U.S. ACTIONS:
- E. IN OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHAT IS OUR JUDGEMENT AS TO THE RISKS SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO TAKE ON BEHALF OF THEIR ARAB FRIENDS?
- F. WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE DIRECT EFFECTS AND THE LIKELY LONGER-RUN COLLATERAL EFFECTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS OF THE ACTIONS WHICH THE U.S. HAS SUGGESTED FOR ALLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS?
- G. WHICH OF THE POSSIBILITIES, IF ANY, DOES THE U.S. NOW SUPPORT, AND WHICH WOULD THE U.S. CONSIDER FOR INDIVIDUAL ACTION AND WHICH IF ANY FOR JOINT (EVEN UNANIMOUS) ACTION?

5. I WAS ABLE TO SIDESTEP THESE QUESTIONS AT THE NAC ON OCTOBER 19. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT NO MAJOR ACTIONS SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE ALLIES UNLESS THE ALLIES ARE BROUGHT AT LEAST A LITTLE WAY IN WITH RESPECT TO WHAT THE U.S. IS DOING AND INTENDS, AND WHY.

6. AT A MINIMUM, WE SHALL NEED TO KNOW IN A GENERAL WAY, BUT NOT RPT NOT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD REVEAL THE DETAILS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES, THE KINDS OF REACTIONS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE SOVIETS. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL ALSO TO HAVE US ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THESE REACTIONS ADD UP TO IN TERMS OF LIKELY SOVIET POLICIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO CONTRAST, IF WE CAN, ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WORDS AND SOVIET ACTIONS AT SPECIFIC TIMES.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

- 3 - USNATO 5038, 20 OCT '73

7. IN SUM, IF WASHINGTON WISHES TO DO MORE WITH THE ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO FORECLOSING MORE OF THE OPTIONS AND NUDGING THEM FURTHER ALONG TRACK THAT US IS FOLLOWING, WE SHALL NEED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A BETTER FEEL OF (A) WHAT IS HAPPENING; (B) WHERE WE ARE GOING; AND (C) HOW FAR AND HOW VISIBLY WE WANT THEM (SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY) TO ACCOMPANY US ALONG THAT PATH.

8. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.  
RUMSFELD

DISSEMINATION

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 864

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ACTION SS-30

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FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4054

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET CAIRO 3167

STADIS//////////

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS EG IS

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

*turn of tide*

1. TO ALL INDICATIONS, BATTLE WHICH OCCURRED THROUGHOUT OCTOBER 17 AND INTO TODAY IN CENTRAL SECTOR OF CANAL'S EAST BANK IS OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS AND OF CONSIDERABLE COST TO BOTH SIDES. IT MAY ALSO BE BEGINNING OF TRUE TEST OF LAND POWER IN SINAI.

2. CAIRO PRESS REPORTS OF VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN ARMOR ARE REINFORCED BY REPORT FROM USINT SOURCE THAT DURING COURSE OF OCTOBER 17 EGYPTIAN ARMY SUFFERED LOSS OF 86 TANKS (WE NOTE IDF TOTALS EGYPTIAN LOSSES ON OCTOBER 17 AS 90-100 TANKS). SOURCE HAS INFORMED US THAT EGYPTIANS SUFFERED 630 MILITARY KILLED AND 780 WOUNDED AND, ALTHOUGH SOURCE DID NOT SAY WHETHER THESE WERE TOTAL EGYPTIAN MILITARY CASUALTIES OR REPRESENTED ONLY THOSE FROM FRONT, CERTAINLY LARGEST LOSS WAS REGISTERED IN ISMAILIA SECTOR.

3. SOURCE HAS ALSO STATED THAT IN CENTRAL SECTOR, EGYPTIAN ARMY SUFFERED A LOSS OF SOME KILOMETERS. IN THIS REGARD, EGYPTIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN WAS REPORTED THIS MORNING BY AKHBAR AS HAVING STATED THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD PENETRATED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03167 181337Z

TO DISTANCE OF 16 KILOMETERS INSIDE SINAI. REFERRING TO SOURCE'S EARLIER INFORMATION THAT EGYPTIANS OCCUPIED POSITIONS 20 KM DEEP OPPOSITE ISMAILIYYA THIS SUGGESTS A MINIMUM LOSS OF FOUR KILOMETERS IN THIS SECTOR AS OF YESTERDAY EVENING.

4. THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THINGS DID NOT GO WELL FOR EGYPTIANS ON OCTOBER 17. THROUGHOUT THE DAY ONLY ONE COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED, AND THAT LATE IN EVENING. TODAY, OCTOBER 18, THERE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN NO OTHER MILITARY ANNOUNCEMENTS. FINALLY, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY NBC TV CORRESPONDENT, WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO GO TO SUEZ FRONT TODAY, THAT GOE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT LAST NIGHT TOLD HIM ALL REQUESTS FOR VISITS TO FRONT WERE BEING POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

5. PICTURE WE ARE GETTING IS THAT EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELI FORCES HAVE BEEN LOCKED IN MAJOR ARMORED BATTLE SINCE YESTERDAY MORNING, AND THAT OFFENSIVE HAS BEGUN TO MOVE INTO ISRAELI HANDS EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARILY. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL NOW, BUT WE MAY BE SEEING THE BEGINNING OF THE TRUE TEST OF POWER BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LAND FORCES. IN VIEW OF EVENTS SINCE OCTOBER 6, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ISRAELI AIRCRAFT CAN PLAY MORE THAN A MINIMAL ROLE IN THIS EVENT.

6. SOURCE ALSO REPORTS THAT ISRAELIS LOST 16 AIRCRAFT, 12 OF THEM IN SUEZ CANAL/FRONT AREA, ON OCTOBER 17.  
SMITH

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 5157Q  
RECD: OCT 18, 1973  
1518Z

O 181430Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1400  
BT  
SECRET ROME 11365

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, EX, NATO, IT, US  
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: STATE 204887

1. I SPOKE WITH SECGEN GAJA DURING THE MORNING OF OCT 17 IN THE ABSENCE OF FONMIN MORO. I TOOK THIS INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO REINFORCE AMB RUMSFELD'S REMARKS IN NAC (REFTEL).
2. GAJA TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED COMPLETE REPORT FROM BRUSSELS AND THAT THE MINISTRY UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION VERY CLEARLY. HE SAID THE ITALIANS HAVE COMPLETE SYMPATHY WITH OUR POSITION AND WILL DO NOTHING TO REFLECT DISAGREEMENT. GAJA INDICATED HE WOULD REVIEW THIS MATTER WITH MORO.
3. I SAID THAT IT WAS NICE TO KNOW THAT THE ITALIANS ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH OUR POSITION BUT IN THIS SERIOUS SITUATION I HOPED THEY WOULD DO MORE AND GIVE US REAL SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING. I EMPHASIZED THAT DETENTE IS A TWO WAY STREET AND THAT OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE AS MUCH AT STAKE AS WE DO IN MAKING THE RUSSIANS REALIZE THIS.
4. GAJA SAID THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ITALY COULD NOT DO WHAT THE US IS DOING, I.E., PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL. I INDICATED APPRECIATION FOR ITALY'S PROBLEMS BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS, ARABS, AND OTHERS INCLUDING THE US CONGRESS WILL CAREFULLY WATCH WHAT THE NATO ALLIES DO AND SAY.
5. AFTER MY INTERVENTION THE FONMINISTRY STUDIED RUMSFELD'S PRESENTATION IN NAC CAREFULLY TO DETERMINE WHAT POSSIBLE HELPFUL ACTIONS ITALY COULD TAKE. TODAY GAJA REPORTED THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO ALL ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN

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TELEGRAM

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-2-ROME 11365, OCT 18

COUNTRIES (EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION) INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA TELLING THEM TO MAKE DEMARCHES WITH THE HOST GOVTS POINTING OUT THE SPECIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR DETENTE OF THE SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDEAST. ITALIANS EMPHASIZED THAT ANY DAMAGE TO DETENTE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ONGOING CSCE. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD MAKE FOR EVEN GREATER DIFFICULTIES IN TRING TO REACH AGREEMENT.

6. IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BELGRADE THE ITALIAN AMB WAS TOLD TO INDICATE THAT YUGOSLAVIA'S PERMISSION FOR RUSSIAN OVERFLIGHTS OF PLANES CARRYING NEW WAR MATERIAL WAS NOT HELPFUL TO THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE.

7. AS THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT OCT 17 GAJA EXPECTED THE AMBS WOULD BE MAKING THE APPROACHES TODAY. VOLPE


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PAGE 01 TEL AV 08319 190022Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

181928Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0171

SECRET TEL AVIV 8319

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, US, IS, XF  
SUBJECT: AIRLIFT - ALL SYSTEMS GO

017069

4  
3  
ANDERSON  
HOLDRIDGE  
HORMATS  
JORDEN  
KENNEDY  
LEHMAN  
LEVINE  
NEGROPONTE  
ODEEN  
RATLIFF  
RONDON  
SAUNDERS  
SONNENFELDT  
V. I. G.  
WALSH

D

THE AIRLIFT IS IN FULL SWING AND OPERATING SMOOTHLY. I PAID D/B  
VISIT TO LOD ON OCT 16 TO INSPECT OPERATION AND WAS MOST  
IMPRESSED BY ALL PHASES BOTH FROM US AND ISRAELI SIDES. SHOULD  
NOTE THAT MOSHE DAYAN AND MRS. MEIR PAID SUBSEQUENT VISITS TO  
CONVEY PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO OUR CREWS. (COMMENT. SHE HAD  
SHOWN TREMENDOUS FASCINATION WITH MY DESCRIPTION OF AIRLIFT  
IN OUR MEETING.)

2. I NOTE FROM TODAY'S WIRELESS FILE AND TELS REPORTING PRESS  
BRIEFINGS AT PENTAGON AND DEPT THAT INEVITABLE QUESTIONS ARE  
BEGINNING TO SURFACE CONCERNING THE PRESENCE AND NATURE OF  
U.S. PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND IN ISRAEL SUPPORTING THE AIR-  
LIFT. INDEED, ONE REPORTER AT PENTAGON RAISED QUESTION IN TERMS  
OF PRESENCE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM AND I PRESUME  
HE WAS REFERRING TO CAMBODIAN MODEL.

3. WE ARE, OF COURSE, GETTING PRESSURE FROM OUR CORPS OF ABOUT  
200 U.S. CORRESPONDENTS WHO WANT TO FILM OR GET DETAILS ABOUT  
AIRLIFT. WE ARE CAREFUL, OF COURSE, TO STAY COMPLETELY IN STEP WITH  
OFFICIAL GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

4. IT WORTH NOTING THAT CRAIG WHITNEY, NEW YORK TIMES, HAS  
TODAY TWICE QUERIED MY PRESS ATTACHE ON POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF  
"AMERICAN PERSONNEL" IN FIGHTING ON NORTHERN FRONT. WHITNEY

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 08319 190022Z

BASING HIS QUERIES ON HIS ALLEGATION THAT HE OVERHEARD "AMERICAN VOICES" ON IDF RADIO IN THE GOLAN AREA. PRESS ATTACHE EMPHATICALLY DENIED ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT IN FIGHTING. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTION, PRESS ATTACHE DENIED ANY U.S. RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT WERE CARRYING MATERIAL DIRECTLY TO FRONT. AT LAST READING, WHITNEY STILL DIGGING AROUND TOWN IN THIS PARTICULAR HOLE, DESPITE OUR ATTEMPTS TO SET HIM STRAIGHT. AS TIME GOES ON, AND IN ABSENCE ANY OFFICIAL INFO FROM USG CONCERNING NATURE AND NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, WE CAN EXPECT MORE OF THESE FLIGHTS OF FANCY BY THE PRESS HERE.

5. AS DEPT IS AWARE, MY DATT IS COMMAND CHANNEL FROM THIS MISSION TO THE LOGISTICS/COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND AT LOD. HE HAS JUST PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO WHICH I BELIEVE WILL BE OF INTEREST:

6. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 41 USAF PERSONNEL AT LOD AIRPORT PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLIFT. THESE INCLUDE:  
A. 6 AIRCRAFT MECHANICS TO ASSIST ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES IN PERFORMING ANY MAINTENANCE REQUIRED ON C-54 OR C-141 AIRCRAFT.  
B. 16 COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS WHO PROVIDE REQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION.  
C. 2 OFFICERS IN COMMAND ELEMENT.  
D. 10 TECHNICIANS WHO OPERATE THE SPECIALIZED OFF LOADING EQUIPMENT.  
E. A DOCUMENTARY TEAM OF 6 AND A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER WHO ARE RECORDING THE AIRLIFT FOR USAF HISTORICAL PURPOSES. THESE PERSONNEL ARE SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO THE U.S. IN NEXT FEW DAYS WHICH WILL DROP FIGURE FROM 41 TO 34. THESE REMAINING 34 PRESUMABLY WILL RETURN WITH FINAL AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT.

7. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE ALSO U.S. CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES IN ISRAEL WHO MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO BE USG TECHNICIANS, ALBEIT CIVILIAN. PRIOR TO THE AIRLIFT THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 5 SUCH REPS RESIDENT IN ISRAEL -- 2 FROM MACDONNELL-DOUGLAS AND 3 FROM G.E. WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WE UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE AN ADDITIONAL 10 OR 11 CONTRACTOR REPS ARRIVING. DURATION OF THEIR STAY UNKNOWN BUT SHOULD BE RELATIVELY SHORT, SINCE ISRAELI TECHNICIANS ARE EXPECTED TO ABSORB NEW INFO QUICKLY.

8. UNLESS THERE IS INFO WE DO NOT HAVE, THEREFORE, OUR SUPPORT

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

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TEAM SHOULD STABILIZE AT 34 USAF PERSONNEL, PLUS 5 CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS PREVIOUSLY IN COUNTRY.

9. THE ORDERS ARE THE SAME, OF COURSE, FOR ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE RESUPPLY EFFORT: HEADS DOWN AND MOUTHS SHUT.  
KEATING





Department of State

WH (a) WOV  
TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

CONTROL: 5022Q

RECD: OCT 18 1973  
0958Z

NODIS  
O 180943Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0161  
BT  
TOP SECRET TEL AVIV 8291

NODIS

E O 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: MASS, IS, US  
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL VIA SIXTH FLEET

IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT PLAN EXISTS TO STAGE TEN  
SKYHAWK A-4S DAILY TO ISRAEL OCTOBER 21 THROUGH 23 WITH  
USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AS LAST SURFACE REFUELLING  
STOP OF AIRCRAFT BEFORE THEY LAND IN ISRAEL. AS CINCNVAIRLANT  
MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 18 ADVISING OF PLAN DOES NOT SHOW STATE AS  
ADDRESSEE, I AM HEREBY NOTING PLAN TO BE CERTAIN YOU ARE AWARE  
OF IT.

KEATING

BT  
#8291

TOP SECRET

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# TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 205807

3.

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO=00 SSO=00 CCO=00 NSCE=00 DODE=00 CIAE=00  
INRE=00 NSAE=00 USSS=00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR:WSTABLER:GMD  
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY  
NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.  
S/S TRPICKERING

0 180050Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MADRID NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO USNMR SHAPE  
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 205807  
EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, PFOR, SP, XF  
SUBJ: USE OF SPANISH BASES IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: MADRID 5933

1. FYI. USG HAS NO PRESENT PLANS FOR USE SPANISH BASES IN CONNECTION WITH MIDDLE EAST OTHER THAN AERIAL REFUELING FROM TORREJON OR POSSIBLE LEGITIMATE EMERGENCY LANDING BOTH OF WHICH WE REGARD AS NORMAL OPERATIONAL PRACTICES. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WISH TO FORECLOSE IN ADVANCE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY REQUEST SOME ADDITIONAL USE AND THEREFORE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE A "STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE". END FYI.

2. AFTER HAVING TRANSMITTED LETTER REGARDING TANKERS AND F-4S (PARA 9 OF REFTTEL) YOU SHOULD SEE LOPEZ RODO AND SPEAK TO HIM ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHENNFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_


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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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(A) USG HAS TAKEN NOTE OF CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH BY LOPEZ RODO AND THE PRESIDENT WILL, OF COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO GENERAL FRANCO.

(B) GOS MUST UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR THE COURSE WE ARE FOLLOWING. WHILE WE WERE ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO BRING AN END TO HOSTILITIES, SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVES IN LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIRLIFT

OF ARMS TO SYRIA, EGYPT AND IRAQ. AS OF OCTOBER 16 NUMBER OF FLIGHTS AMOUNTED TO SOME 400 CARRYING OVER 5,000 TONS OF MATERIEL. THIS MASSIVE INTERVENTION BY THE SOVIETS HAS OBLIGED US TO BEGIN A RESUPPLY EFFORT FOR ISRAEL. WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALLOW SOVIE UNION TO DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF PRESENT SITUATION. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WILL NOT REMAIN PASSIVE IN THE FACE OF THIS SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

(C) WE VIEW RE-  
SUPPLY EFFORT AS NECESSARY IF US TO REMAIN IN POSITION TO USE US INFLUENCE TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST ONCE HOSTILITIES END.

(D) WE CONSIDER THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING TO MAINTAIN BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS ALONE BUT IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OUR FRIENDS AND PARTICULARLY THOSE, LIKE SPAIN, THAT ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. WE BELIEVE THAT SPAIN SHOULD CONSIDER WITH THE UTMOST GRAVITY WHAT CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE FOR HER SHOULD SOVIETS SUCCEED IN THEIR PRESENT ADVENTURE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IF OUR EFFORTS ARE SUCCESSFUL THE ARABS WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MUST DEAL WITH THE US IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT. GOS MAY BE SURE THAT AN END TO THE FIGHTING WILL OPEN THE WAY FOR ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A LASTING PEACE.

(E) WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC REQUEST TO MAKE OF THE GOS AT THIS TIME. WHAT WE PRESENTLY SEEK IS SUPPORT AND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 205807


UNDERSTANDING FOR WHAT WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO DO AND A RECOGNITION BY THE GOS THAT A TOTALLY INWARD LOOKING ATTITUDE ON THEIR PART IS NOT A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION AT BEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES WHICH GOS MAY TAKE AT THIS TIME CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE AN EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONS. WHILE WE DO INDEED HOPE FOR AN UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDE OF GOS, THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT THAT WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF PURSUING OUR PRESENT COURSE.

3. WITH REGARD TO PROPOSAL FOR "EXTRAORDINARY AND URGENT MEETING" OF JOINT COMMITTEE, YOU SHOULD TELL LOPEZ RODO THAT IN LIGHT OF FULL STATEMENT OF USG POSITION YOU HAVE JUST MADE AND LETTER WHICH YOU HAVE SENT HIM, USG PERCEIVES NO NEED FOR SUCH A MEETING. IF HE INSISTS HOWEVER YOU MAY AGREE TO SUCH MEETING BUT YOU SHOULD PLACE HIM ON NOTICE THAT YOU HAVE NOTHING

TO ADD TO THE STATEMENT YOU HAVE JUST MADE.

4. FYI. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULT SITUATION ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS PLACE YOU IN BUT SERIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND OBJECTIVE OF OUR RESUPPLY EFFORT REQUIRE THAT ALL POSSIBLE OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN TO BRING OUR EFFORTS TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WE THEREFORE MUST TAKE THE RISK OF PROVOKING GOS IRE WHILE AT SAME TIME FORCING GOS TO DECIDE HOW FAR IT WISHES TO GO IN FRUSTRATING OUR EFFORTS, THUS ADVERSELY AFFECTING US-SPANISH RELATIONS.

5. WE ARE PREPARING A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL REPLY WHICH MAY EMBODY SOME OF THE GENERAL POINTS CONTAINED PARA 2. KISSINGER



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 096

PAGE 01 STATE 206423

17 11  
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 PCH-08 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03  
SS-20 ACDA-19 IO-14 GCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00  
USSS-00 USIE-00 AID-20 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 /198 R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE: JDEAN:JFC  
APPROVED BY NEA TASK FORCE - DAVID A. KORN  
STENO R. ELTZ

006195

0180452Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH  
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH  
AMCONSUL CURACAO BY POUCH  
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE BY POUCH

SECRET STATE 206423

INFORM CONSULS

KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT, DOHA

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS XX  
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

1. FOLLOWING IS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION THROUGH EVENING  
OCTOBER 17.

2. MILITARY SITUATION: ISRAELIS CLAIM TO HAVE ESTABLISHED  
BRIDGEHEAD ON WEST BANK OF CENTRAL SECTOR OF CANAL SUP-  
PORTED BY ONE PONTOON BRIDGE. IN FIGHTING IN SINAI OCT. 17,  
ISRAELIS SAY THEY DESTROYED 90-100 EGYPTIAN TANKS. EGYPT-

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 206423

TIANS CLAIM ISRAELI FORCE TRAPPED AND ERADICATED. ISRAELIS ADMIT AT LEAST 5 A/C LOST IN SINAI AIR ACTIVITY WHILE CLAIMING ONE EGYPTIAN MIG DOWNED. SYRIAN FRONT GENERALLY QUIET, WITH LIMITED ATTACKS BY JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN ELEMENTS REPULSED, ACCORDING TO ISRAELIS, WHO ALSO REPORT DOWNING SIX SYRIAN AIRCRAFT.

3. FOUR ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MET WITH THE PRESIDENT TODAY; THEY ALSO MET WITH THE SECRETARY BEFORE AND AFTER THEIR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT. IN THE PUBLIC EXCHANGE OF REMARKS AFTER THEIR MEETING, PRESIDENT STATED THAT A MAJOR AND URGENT GOAL OF THE US IS A "FAIR AND JUST AND EQUITABLE PEACE."

4. ACCORDING TO AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE OAPEC CONFERENCE ON OCT. 17, EACH OF THE ELEVEN ARAB PRODUCERS SAY THEY WILL IMMEDIATELY CUT OIL PRODUCTION BY FIVE PER CENT (BASED ON SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION) AND WILL CONTINUE TO CUT BY THE SAME AMOUNT EACH MONTH UNTIL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE RETURNED TO THE RIGHTFUL OWNERS AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE RESTORED. HOW THESE CUTS WILL BE APPLIED TO EXPORTS TO PARTICULAR COUNTRIES IS NOT YET CLEAR. THE STATEMENT SAYS ONLY THAT "THIS DECISION WILL NOT HARM ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY WHICH IS HELPING THE ARABS NOW OR WILL HELP THEM IN THEIR STRUGGLE. THEY WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH PETROLEUM IN THE SAME QUANTITIES AS BEFORE THE DECISION."

5. PERSIAN GULF PRODUCERS ANNOUNCED A 70 PER CENT INCREASE IN THE POSTED PRICES OF THEIR CRUDE AND ABU DHABI PLACED AN ADDITIONAL LOW-SULPHUR PREMIUM ON ITS CRUDE, RAISING THE POSTED PRICE TO OVER SIX DOLLARS PER BARREL.

6. THERE WERE INCREASED CALLS FOR ACTION AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD BY MORE RADICAL ARAB MEDIA AND ORGANIZATIONS, BUT THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST AMERICAN COMMUNITIES.

7. THE SOVIET FLEET CONTINUED ITS BUILD-UP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NOW NUMBERS 70, THE HIGHEST LEVEL EVER.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET

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SOVIET RESUPPLY OF THE ARABS CONTINUED AT HIGH LEVELS. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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3



NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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OP IMMED  
ESA209AAA463  
DE RUE SKW #3800 2911425  
O 181358Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7929

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0721  
USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0235  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3361  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0091  
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0125  
AMCONSUL DHANAN IMMEDIATE 1698  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0388  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0036  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1607  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0535  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1828  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0049  
AMEMBASSY BUNN IMMEDIATE 0123  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0112  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0158  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0534  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0073  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0049  
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0382  
USMISSION OLCO PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 3800

BEIRUT PASS BAHGUAD  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ENRG, XX, XF  
SUBJECT: OPEC OIL MINISTERS MEETING  
REF KUWAIT 3784 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

1. TEXT OF OFFICIAL OPEC PRESS RELEASE ISSUED FOLLOWING OCTOBER  
17 ARAB OIL MINISTERS MEETING BEING SENT SEPTEL. EMBASSY  
COMMENTS ON MEETING FOLLOW.

2. AS PREDICTED IN REFTEL AND EARLIER CABLES ARAB OIL  
MINISTERS CAME UP WITH MINIMUM OIL/PRODUCTION REDUCTION  
PACKAGE WHICH THEY FELT WOULD SIGNAL ARAB DISPLEASURE WITH

PEN:009212 PAGE 01 TOR:291/15:22Z DTG:181358Z OCT 73

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US AND SATISFY ARAB OPINION WHILE CAUSING MINIMAL INITIAL DISRUPTION TO FRIENDLY STATES. TONE OF OPEC PRESS RELEASE IS MODERATE AND INTENDS CONVEY IMPRESSION ARAB STATES WISH BE RESPONSIBLE TO WORLD COMMUNITY BUT THEY AT END OF ROPE. IN THIS CONNECTION OPEC DEPUTY SYG AL-TURKI TOLD LMBU EXPRESS RELEASE SHOULD BE READ AS WHOLE AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS SHOULD NOT BE READ OUT OF CONTEXT.

3. MOST SIGNIFICANT DECISION WAS TO LIMIT OIL PRODUCTION BY 5 PERCENT AND THEN TO DECREASE PRODUCTION ANS ADDITIONAL 5 PERCENT PER MONTH UNTIL SOLUTION TO CRISIS IS FOUND. INCIDENTALLY ABU DHABI ACCORDING TO LOCAL PRESS REPORT ANNOUNCED DECISION TO STOP ALL CRUDE OIL EXPORT TO "FRIENDLY" COUNTRIES, 5 PERCENT PRODUCTION REDUCTION IS TANTAMOUNT TO EMBARGO OF ARAB CRUDE OIL TO US.

4. PRESS RELEASE DOES NOT DEFINE WHO FRIENDLY STATES ARE. NOR DOES IT SPECIFY WHETHER GAS OR REFINED PRODUCTS ARE INVOLVED. AL-TURKI TOLD BRITISH EMBASSY THERE NO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTION TO IMPLEMENT CONTROLS. THIS LEFT TO INDIVIDUAL STATES. OPEC STATES WILL IN FACT NOT BE ABLE PREVENT "FRIENDLY" STATES FROM BEING INCREASINGLY HARMED ONCE PRODUCTION LIMITATIONS BECOME EFFECTIVE AND AS PERCENTAGE CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION CUTBACK INCREASED.  
STOLTZFUS  
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ON OIL TO UNITED STATES BUT AT SAME TIME MINIMAL  
PRIVATION TO ALL OTHER OIL CONSUMERS. SUCCEEDING  
MONTHLY FIVE PERCENT REDUCTION WOULD OF COURSE  
INCREASINGLY AFFECT OTHER CONSUMERS. IN CASE OF KUWAIT,  
HE SAID, OIL EXPORTS TO US WERE LESS THAN TWO PERCENT.  
THIS OIL WOULD BE HALTED RIGHT AWAY AND BALANCE OF THREE  
PERCENT (AT MINIMUM) WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF OIL TO OTHER  
CUSTOMERS.

3. ATEEQI SAID MODERATES AT CONFERENCE HAD TO FIGHT  
HARD TO HOLD DOWN DEMANDS OF OTHERS FOR MUCH MORE  
DOMESTIC OIL CUTS. MODERATE THEORY THAT FINALLY WON OUT  
WAS THAT OIL CUT-BACKS SHOULD SKIVE PRIMARY AS  
WARNING TO US AND OTHER CONSUMERS THAT ARAB OIL  
PRODUCERS AS SERIOUS AS FRONT LINE FIGHTERS THAT ISRAEL  
MUST GIVE UP OCCUPIED LANDS. US AND OTHER CONSUMERS MUST  
LOOK TO WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LIE; THOSE THAT DID NOT  
WOULD COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE AS MONTHS WENT BY.  
ATEEQI SAID OPEC NOT RPT NOT CONCERNED ABOUT  
ANY POOLING ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT BY  
CONSUMERS. THE LONGER SATISFACTORY ARAB SETTLEMENT  
WITH ISRAEL WAS DELAYED, THE SHORTER THE OIL SUPPLY WOULD  
BECOME FOR EVERYONE. THIS IN ADDITION TO FACT THAT  
MARGIN OF OIL AVAILABLE TO ANY ONE CONSUMER TO PASS ON  
TO ANOTHER ALREADY VERY THIN.

4. ATEEQI TOLD RE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC MENTION OF UNITED  
STATES IN OPEC ANNOUNCEMENT WAS AT INSISTENCE OF SAUDIS.

5. I ASKED ATEEQI WHETHER HE DID NOT HAVE SOME OPTIMISM  
THAT PRUDICIOUS EFFORTS NOW BEING MADE TO BRING CRISIS TO  
AN END WOULD SUCCEED. ATEEQI SAID HE FERVENTLY HOPED SO.  
HOWEVER, PRESENT MOOD OF ARABS WAS NOT ONE OF COMPROMISE.  
ALL ARABS ARE IN THE FIGHT AND THOSE WITH ECONOMIC POWER  
THAN MILITARY WEAPON  
HAD TO USE THEM.

STOLTZFUS

BT

PSN:009240

PAGE 02

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DTG:181455Z OCT 73

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESA797KGA362  
DE RUEKNG #5563 291100Z  
P 181000Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9765

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 7359  
USINT CAIRO 2510  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4761  
AMEMBASSY JORDA 2401  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1721  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5541

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 5563  
E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR, JJ, IS, XP  
SUBJECT: HUSSEIN ADDRESSES FOREIGN PRESS CORPS

1. KING ADDRESSED FOREIGN PRESS CORPS FOR ABOUT 25 MINUTES MID-AFTERNOON OCTOBER 17. RELATIVE OF MINISTER OF INFORMATION DUDIN CONFIRMED TO NBC NEW REP THAT THIS PURELY CONCILIATORY GESTURE AFTER PALACE BECAME AWARE OF INCIPIENT PRESS REVOLT OVER TIGHTENING CENSORSHIP (DETAILS REPORTED SEPARATELY). PARA 2 CONTAINS KEY EXCERPTS.

2. "SINCE 1967 I HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT DANGER TO PEACE WILL EXIST UNLESS THERE IS HONORABLE, EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT TO PALESTINE PROBLEM....CURRENT SITUATION RESULTS FROM ISRAEL'S INTRANSIGENT, ARRUGANT, EXPANSIONIST POLICIES....ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST AIDS CLOAKED WITH SO-CALLED DESIRE FOR SECURE BOUNDARIES... REGRETTABLE THAT GHI DID NOTHING IN PREVIOUS YEARS TO ACHIEVE JUST PEACE...IN AUGUST 1967 I SAID ISRAEL MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN OBTAINING TERRITORY OR PEACE BECAUSE IT CANNOT HAVE BOTH...WE ARE STILL FAR FROM HAVING PEACE AND A BETTER WORLD....ISRAEL SHOULD DECIDE BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE...SECURE BORDER CANNOT BE POSITIONS ON THE GROUND BUT PEACE CAN OCCUR WHEN PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO CO-EXIST...WE HAVE HOPE FOR FUTURE AND ARE DETERMINED TO STRUGGLE FOR HONORABLE

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SETTLEMENT, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE ARE PREPARED TO CEDE RIGHTS TO OUR LAND, ESPECIALLY TO JERUSALEM...I SAID BEFORE THAT ARABS WILL FIGHT AGAIN AND AGAIN; I ALSO SAID IF WE WERE NOT ABLE TO USE MODERN WEAPONS AND EXPLOIT ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AS IN 1967, DAY WOULD COME WHEN WE COULD...PALESTINE IS OUR PROBLEM, ITS PEOPLE ARE OUR PEOPLE...WE CAME TO AID OF SYRIA FOR MANY REASONS CONNECTED WITH OUR HISTORY...OUR FORCES ENTERED SYRIA AND PARTICIPATED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY; WE MADE GAINS AND SUFFERED LOSSES...ARAB NATION IS NOT SEEKING DESTRUCTION BUT HONORABLE PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE, RESTORATION OF USURPED RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE BETTER WORLD...I HOPE FIERCE BATTLE OF TODAY WILL BE THE LAST; THIS CAN BE IF ISRAELIS RECONSIDER ALL THEIR ATTITUDES FOR SAKE OF OWN INTEREST AND WORLD PEACE."

3. OUR IMPRESSION, WHICH SHARED BY AMERICAN NEWSMEN WHO ATTENDED, IS THAT KING MERELY REPEATED CONSISTENT POLICY POSITION: THAT JORDAN EAGER FOR PEACE BUT CANNOT ABDICATE WEST BANK CLAIMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATED TO JERUSALEM. SEEMS TO HAVE LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON JORDAN LINKS WITH PALESTINE; HOWEVER, THERE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE OF ANY STIFFENING OF TERMS. NEWSMEN WHO ATTENDED SAID HM SPOKE SLOWLY AND DELIBERATELY; THEY REALIZED HE NOT SHARING ANY POLICY SECRETS BUT AT SAME TIME WERE PLEASED BY APPARENT EFFORTS TO MAKE AMENUS FOR CENSORSHIP EXCESSES. DECON 10/18/74.

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESA834RAA749  
DE RUEKRA 44582 2911145  
P R 180801Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5229

INFO USINT ALGIERS 231  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4633  
AMCONSUL DHAKRA 6029  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2023  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 588  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 68  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 823  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 117  
AMEMBASSY ROME 451  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 53  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 59  
AMEMBASSY BONN 194

oil

S E C R E T JIDDA 4582

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: ENRG, SA, XF, EEC  
REF JIDDA 4548

1. JAPANESE FIRST SECRETARY (PROTECT) TOLD EMROFF OCT 17  
THAT JAPAN WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO PLACE ANY  
PRESSURE ON US REGARDING ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL IF IT  
WAS ASKED TO DO SO. THEY WERE RELIEVED THAT SAG HAD  
CHOSEN SO FAR NOT TO INCLUDE THEM IN APPROACH MADE TO  
SIX COUNTRIES. (JIDDA RADIO ANNOUNCED MEETING OF REPRE-  
SENTATIVES SIX EEC COUNTRIES -- UK, FRANCE, ITALY, BELGIUM,  
WEST GERMANY, NETHERLANDS -- WITH FUNMIN OFFICIAL WITHOUT  
ANY HINTS ON SUBJECT.)

2. SPECULATING ON WHY JAPAN HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED, FIRST  
SECRETARY DHARA SAID IT MIGHT BE BECAUSE SAG WELL  
AWAKE JAPAN HAS SIMPLY BEEN UNINVOLVED IN ME CONFLICT AND  
HAS HEWED TO CAREFULLY BALANCED POSTURE BETWEEN ISRAEL  
AND ARAB STATES. WITH NO ARMS FOR SALE HERSELF, SHE WAS  
THE LEAST LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE IN SUGGESTING RESTRAINT

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ON THE US, DESPITE HER PUBLIC STATEMENT AGAINST ARMS  
SUPPLY TO THE ME AT THIS TIME BY THIRD PARTIES.

3. SPECULATING FURTHER, OHARA ADDED THAT SAG MAY WISH  
AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES  
ON USE OF OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON. CONSISTENT SAUDI  
EFFORT TO AVOID UNITING OPEC ENERGY  
COMMITTEE IN OPPOSITION TO UPEC WAS ADDITIONAL REASON TREAT  
JAPAN DIFFERENTLY. HE ADMITTED JAPAN WORRIED DEEPLY BY  
STRATEGIC ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES STEMMING FROM PRESENT ME  
CONFLICT.

4. THREE WEEKS AGO MINPFI YAMANI TOLD JAPANESE AMBASSADOR  
THAT SAG HAD NEVER CONTEMPLATED UP TO THAT MOMENT ANY  
DISCRIMINATORY OIL SALES POLICY AND WONDERED IF THIS WOULD  
IN ANY CASE BE POSSIBLE. ENBOFF WILL SEE OHARA AGAIN OCT. 19,  
WHEN HIS AMBASSADOR RETURNS FROM RIYADH WHERE HE HAS APPOINTMENT  
WITH DEPPETHIN PRINCE SAUD.

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DE RNESAD #8310 2911605  
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FM USDAO/TFL-AVIISRAEL

TO DIA WASHDC  
RUEHC (SECSTATE WASTON  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
INEV KUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
CD WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
DA WASHDC  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GER  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENG  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER  
COMSIXTHFLT  
WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM WASHDC

S E C R E T NOFORN DISSEM 1795 OCT 73

SUBJ: MAJOR BATT  
WLHEAD UMCWLT BANK OF SUEZ CANAL (SNF)

1. (SNFD) INFO BREF BY MG ZEIRA, DMI, INDICATES THAT  
MAJOR BATTLE, IF NUTHELREKHY JOINED WILW SOON TAKE PLANE  
ON WEST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL.

IFOM (SNFB) ZEIRA TRACED THE HISTORY OF THE IDF BRIDGEHEAD.  
HE STATED THAT THE DECISION TO BREAK THROUGH TO THE CANAL  
JUST NORTH OF GREAT BITTER LAKE (APPROX 3026N-3220E) WAS A  
DELIBERATE ONE. THEY CHOSE TO BREAK THROUGH THE STRONGEST  
EGY SEC XR ON EAST BANK -- THE COMBINEFFORCES OF THE 16TH  
INF DIV & THE 21ST ARMD DIV. REASONING WAS THAT IF THEY  
BROKE THRU WEAKBI SECTOD THIS FORMIDABLE FORCE WOULD BE  
INTACT BEHIND THEM.

3. (SMTD) THUS, IDF BP(3 5#47 5#8 3:594 5:-,-),

H  
DRIVING WEDGE BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS OF BOW #8;. AS  
REPORTED EARLIER IDF PUT FORCE, 20 TKS WITH SUPPORTING  
MFCH INF ACROSS CANAL INTO SMALL BRIDGEHEAD. LAST NIGHT'S  
UPDATED NR OF TANKS TO 3).

4. (SNFD) ZEIRA REPORTED THAT YESTERDAY EGY MOUNTED  
A COORD ATTACK ON EAST BANK BRIDGEHEAD FROM N & S. NVYTJR DIVDED ELEMENTS OF 16 A

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21ST DIVS. 25TH ARMD BDE OF  
21ST DIV LEAD ATK FROM S. HIDE AMBUSHED AND CLAIMS 80 PERCENT  
OF BDE TKS  
EST. CLAIMS THE 25TH BDE NO LONGER EXISTS. ALL  
OTHER ATKS FROM MP N & S WERE REPULSED & SEIRA CLAIMS BOTH  
16TH & 21ST DIVS ESSENTIALLY DEST AS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING  
FORCES.

5. (SNFD) IDF ARMOR ROLLED N ON EAST BANK AND WIDENED  
ORIGINAL NARROW CORRIDOR TO APPROX 300 M. (248463#3-5. BRIDGE-  
HEAD UNCEST BANK ALSO SAID TO HAVE BEEN WIDENED TO APPROX  
7KM ON CANAL (IDF PARATROOPS PUSHED N FROM ORIG BRIDGEHEAD).  
WEST OF CANAL BRIDGEHEAD DESCRIBED AS A BULGE CONTAINING  
150 IDF TKS, SPTG MECH INF, & PARATROOPS. ZEIRA STATED  
THAT IDF MADE BIG PUSH LAST NIGHT TO PUSH REINFORCEMENTS  
ACROSS CANAL. /4

6. (SNFD) WHILE IDF REINFORCING ON, ZEIRA CLAIMS THAT  
EGY MOVED ALL (UGV MOST) OF 2D ARMY'S MD & HVY ARGY FM PSNS  
BEHIND NORTHERN SECTOR TO PSNS BEHIND CENTRAL SECTOR FM  
WHICH THEY INTENDED TO KNOCK OUT IDF BRIDGE. ZEIRA CLAIMS  
THAT BETWEEN 0800-0900Z TODAY, IDF WEST BANK FORCES ATKD &  
DESTROYED ALL OR MOST OF THIS ARTY.

7. (SNFFGL ACCORDING TO ZEIRA, THE EGY 3D MECH HAS ADV FM  
ITS PSN IN CAIRO DEFENSE LINES, TO CHALLENGE THE IDF BRIDGE-  
HEAD. HE ESTIMATES THAT THEY PROBABLY DEPLOYED A FORCE OF  
APPROX 60 TKS ACROSS APPROACHES TO CAIRO AND PL 59 5#ROW.  
REMAINDER OF UNIT INTO BATTLE. HE FURTHER CLAIMS THAT  
WEST BANK ELEMENTS OF 23D MECH DIV ARE CLOSING ON BRIDGE-  
HEAD FORCE FM THE NO. 6 THOSE OF THE 4TH ARMD DIV CLOSING  
FM SOUTH.

8. (CKSNFD) ZEIRA BY  
IMAH S THAT IDF FORCES ON WEST BANK  
FACE A COMBINED TOTAL OF APPROX 240 TKS, PLUS MECH INF  
PARATROOPS. HE STATED THAT IMPENDING BATTLE COULD END IN  
ANY OF 3 WAYS: A. IDF FORCE DEFEATED OR PUSHED BACK  
ACROSS CANAL (PREDICTABLY, ZEIRA OPINED THAT THIS KUS A  
NONYESP  
RTER); B. IDF CONTAINED; & C. IDF VICTORY, BREAK OUT  
AND ADVANCE.

9. (SNFD) IF THE IDF DOES BREAKOUT, THERE ARE SEVERAL  
OPTIONS OPEN, ACCORDING TO ZEIRA, INCLUDING ADV ON  
CAIRO. HE SEEMED QUITE CONFIDENT ABOUT OUTCOME, (WHICH  
IS NOT AN ATYPICAL ISRAELI ATTITUDE) 68775. (9, 3435 5#-5  
5#3 2#9) 3 90, 8 548:5  
- "AGAINST THE BOOKS". NOTE: IT  
IS, HOWEVER, EXACTLY THE TYPE OF AUDACIOUS AND FLAMBOYANT

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ACTION THAT THE ISRAELI PUBLIC HAS AUTOMATICALLY ASSUMED WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

10. (SNED) OTHER ITEMS REGARDLYG THE EGY FRONT: ZEIRA BELIEVES THAT EGY 20 & 30 ARMY PERS ON EAST BANK OF CANAL HAVE LOST THEIR FIGHTING SPIRIT. HE CLAIMS THMK LEAVES THE INITIATIVE SOLEY WITH THE IDF. A. EGY AF QUIET UNTIL APPROX 1230Z WHEN THEY BEGAN TO MOUNT MAJOR EFFORT TO DEST IDF BRIDGE. OUTCOME UNK. ZEIRA ASSUMED THAT IAF COULD ENGAGE EAF WITHOUT WORRYING 1975 --, BUT STATED THAT SINCE WAR BEGAN, THEY BELIEVE THAT APPROX 15 EGY A/C HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN BY EGY SAMS/AAA & OTHER EGY A/C. B. IAF ATKD 6 SAM SITES N OF ISMAILIA THIS A.M. THEY BELIEVE SITES WERE DEST, BUT AT A HIGH PRICE. 6 IAF A/C DOWNED (2-F-4'S; 4 A-4'S) 2 PILOTS RECOVERED BY IDF. HE FURTHER STATED THAT 2 DOWNED IAF PILOTS YESTERDAY WERE CAPTURED & THEN KILLED BY EGY CIVILIANS NEAR CANAL. SAMS DUSTING HAS BEEN EXTREMELY COSTLY FOR THE IAF WHICH LEADS ZEIRA TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAVE NO CHOICE NOW BUT TO DESTROY SAMS WITH TANKS.

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